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Microbes are not only extremely social but also extremely discerning about whom they 
socialize with. Recent research has uncovered some of the evolutionary explanations behind 
these feats of social sophistication in bacteria (Ackermann et al., 2008; Diggle et al., 2007) and, 
most recently, has provided insights into the molecular mechanisms of discrimination in yeast 
(Smukalla et al., 2008).Cooperative acts ranging from minor help to marked self-sac-
rifice are seen in all corners of biology, from microbes to man. 
Given the presence of “freeloading cheaters,” why is it that 
cooperative behaviors persist? Following the pioneering work 
of Hamilton (1964), a consensus has emerged that coopera-
tive behaviors evolve and are maintained through a mix of self-
interest and nepotism, which maximizes an individual’s inclusive 
fitness, that is, the reproductive success of an individual and its 
close relatives. Cooperation may be self-interested if it directly 
benefits the actor as well as the recipients (for instance, increas-
ing the success of one’s own group). More extreme forms of 
cooperation—for example, altruistic cooperation where individ-
uals experience a direct fitness cost in helping others—may be 
favored because the behavior helps recipients who are likely to 
share the altruistic gene (Hamilton, 1964). In other words, natural 
selection will cause a gene to spread if it confers an advantage 
on the individual in which the gene is present, as well as if it con-
fers an advantage on other individuals with the same gene. But 
for this latter process to operate, altruistic acts must be prefer-
entially directed toward other altruists. The most common sce-
nario is that altruism is expressed blindly to neighbors, who will 
tend to be relatives (with an overrepresentation of similar genes) 
due simply to population viscosity (there is not complete mix-
ing of individuals within the population) (Hamilton, 1964). A more 
complex scenario involves active processes of kin recognition 
and discrimination. However, this is not a perfect system as kin 
may still be “cheaters” that lack the vital gene for altruism.
Hamilton (1964) realized that one foolproof way to avoid 
wasting help on cheaters is for an individual to clearly display 
an altruistic or social gene and to recognize directly the same 
gene in others, rather than relying on proxy identifiers such as 
location or kinship. An individual social gene displays itself and 
enables recognition of the same gene in others, thus ensuring 
that help is only conferred on individuals expressing that gene. 
Richard Dawkins (1976) popularized this notion as the “green 
beard” gene: a gene that can be recognized externally because 
it confers a green beard on its carrier, ensuring that only green-
bearded individuals are helped.
Hunting for Green Beard Genes
Green beard genes remained a plausible thought experiment 
until a remarkable empirical example was reported by Keller 
and Ross (1998): They discovered a gene cluster linked to the 600 Cell 135, November 14, 2008 ©2008 Elsevier Inc.display and discrimination of identity in red fire ants. Next, Quel-
ler et al. (2003) identified an even tighter association between 
display, discrimination, and social traits in the first clear docu-
mentation of a single green beard gene in the slime mold Dic-
tyostelium discoideum. When food is plentiful, Dictyostelium 
amoebae lead a single-celled, individualistic life of consump-
tion and (asexual) reproduction. However, once starvation 
arrives they aggregate to form multicellular assemblies, replete 
with complex signaling mechanisms, division of labor, and 
individual sacrifice. The multicellular slugs differentiate into a 
sacrificial stalk, on top of which sit the lucky spores, which can 
then hitch a ride on invertebrates to potentially more favorable 
destinations. Queller et al. (2003) demonstrated that a single 
gene is responsible for holding nonstalk-forming “cheaters” at 
bay, by controlling entry to the spores. The csaA gene encodes 
a cell adhesion protein anchored in the cell membrane (the 
discernable green beard), which binds to homologous adhe-
sion proteins (discrimination), building a multicellular aggre-
gate preferentially of csaA carriers (targeted cooperation). This 
simple mechanism highlights the ability of microbes to harness 
molecular tricks to build sophisticated social behaviors (Fos-
ter et al., 2007), raising the possibility that these feats may be 
more common in microbes than previously suspected. Indeed, 
the bacterium Proteus mirabilis will only form motile swarms 
with those of the same strain. Although the molecular mecha-
nism behind this recognition has not yet been fully deduced, a 
set of genes required for the recognition of “like” cells has been 
identified in P. mirabilis (Gibbs et al., 2008).
A Discriminating Yeast
The latest addition to the green beard gene stable, as Smukalla 
et al. (2008) report in this issue of Cell, appears in an unex-
pected microbe, the budding yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. 
Most strains of S. cerevisiae display an aggregating response 
to environmental stress called flocculation. Smukalla et al. 
(2008) now reveal that the expression of a single gene, FLO1, 
restores flocculation to a laboratory strain of S. cerevisiae, 
S288C, generating, at an individual cost, a social protection for 
S288C yeast within the aggregate (floc) against diverse envi-
ronmental stresses such as ethanol and fungicides. But what 
about the potential for nonexpressing flo1 cells to act as cheat-
ers, exploiting the protection of established aggregates without 
paying the cost associated with FLO1 expression? Smukalla et 
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al. (2008) go on to demonstrate that FLO1 expression results 
in the targeting of help (aggregation) to other FLO1-expressing 
cells, another case of green beard-directed discrimination.
The molecular mechanism underlying the preferential attach-
ment of FLO1-expressing yeast cells to like cells is similar to 
the role of csaA in D. discoideum. However, rather than binding 
to identical neighboring proteins as in the case of csaA, the 
adhesin encoded by FLO1 binds to oligosaccharide chains on 
the surface of S. cerevisiae cells. Therefore, yeast decorated 
with Flo1 adhesins are more likely to bind together. Interest-
ingly, although FLO1-expressing cells are still capable of some 
binding to cells that do not express FLO1, this low-frequency 
binding presents a surprising benefit to the cooperating FLO1-
expressing cells near the surface of the aggregate. The Flo1 
adhesins attract and bind a layer of cheater cells that coat the 
outside of the floc, so that 
these cheaters act as a first 
line of defense against envi-
ronmental stress.
The overarching function of 
aggregate formation in yeast 
expressing FLO1 and slime 
molds expressing csaA is simi-
lar, providing a self-chosen few 
with an escape from an unfa-
vorable environment. Smukalla 
et al. (2008) show that, as for 
D. discoideum, FLO1-express-
ing yeast seem to regulate 
their aggregative behavior in 
response to their environmen-
tal state, including their local density (as it would be difficult to 
aggregate without many cells). This regulation may occur in direct 
response to environmental stresses such as ethanol, which may 
additionally serve as an indicator of density (ethanol is produced 
by yeast during fermentation). Interestingly, ethanol production 
may be under additional selective pressure by flocculating yeast 
because of its toxic properties, which may be more harmful to 
nonflocculating yeast. This suggests the possibility of cells spe-
cifically directing harm, rather tha just omitting cooperative acts, 
to individuals that do not share the same genes.
Who to Help, Who to Kill?
Classic green beard theory focuses on altruistic traits where 
the behavior imposes a net cost to the enactor and a net  benefit 
to the recipient. However, the first empirical case of a green 
beard gene was an example of spite: red fire ants engaged 
in individually costly acts of antagonism against individuals 
lacking the green beard trait. Recent research also points to 
the widespread importance of green beard spite in microbes 
(Foster et al., 2007). For altruism or spite to evolve, Hamilton’s 
rule rb > c must be satisfied (Hamilton, 1964, 1970; see Box 1). 
By using spiteful green beard traits, microbes can actively tar-
get “unrelated” individuals that do not share the spiteful gene 
(Gardner et al., 2004).
Wherever microbial lineages compete for resources, a com-
mon outcome is the costly expression of secreted anticompet-
itor chemical weapons such as bacteriocins (Riley and Wertz, 
2002). These compounds bind to specific receptors on recipi-
ent cells and act through numerous mechanisms, including the 
destruction of cell wall integrity and the inhibition of essen-
tial enzymes. Crucially, bacteriocins are tightly linked to spe-
cific immunity genes, meaning that individuals with a specific 
bacteriocin gene will also be immune to its effect (Riley and 
Wertz, 2002). This linkage creates a green beard gene complex 
that recognizes and punishes noncarriers. A number of recent 
papers have outlined a further example of microbial spite 
beyond the production of anticompetitor chemicals. Some of 
these studies found that bacteria carrying quiescent phage can 
use these “domesticated” viruses as a spiteful anticompetitor 
tool against bacteria that do not carry them (Brown et al., 2006; 
Joo et al., 2006). Other studies, including a recent report in 
Nature by Ackermann et al. (2008), have uncovered the poten-
tial ability of diverse patho-
genic microbes to exploit the 
power of their hosts’ immune 
systems to differentially kill 
competitors.
Pathogens can provoke an 
immune response that prefer-
entially damages competitors. 
In contrast to specific target-
ing of certain individuals, the 
immunological “weapon” may 
be nonspecific (e.g., an inflam-
matory response). However, 
discrimination can still be 
engineered if the spiteful lin-
eage is also better protected 
against the inflammatory reaction that they provoke (Brown et al., 
2008). In their study, Ackermann et al. (2008) use a combination of 
mathematical modeling and in vivo experiments to shed light 
on the role that phenotypic noise plays within a population 
during self-destructive cooperative behaviors. As with all 
cases of self-destructive altruism (bee stings being a classic 
example), heterogeneous expression of the altruism gene 
within the population is crucial for the behavior to persist. 
If all individuals with the altruistic gene carried out the self-
sacrificial altruistic act, there would be no surviving relatives 
carrying the altruism gene to reap the benefits. Ackermann 
and colleagues confirm in their model that altruistic acts 
directed toward individuals that share the same genes (high 
relatedness) in combination with gene expression heteroge-
neity (phenotypic noise) favor self-destructive cooperation. 
They further demonstrated that infection of the mouse gut 
by Salmonella typhimurium is mediated through mecha-
nisms broadly consistent with their model. S. typhimurium 
uses heterogeneous expression of virulence factors (which 
could be stochastic but may be affected by the physiologi-
cal state of the bacterium) to outcompete their competitors 
during colonization of the mammalian gut. Ackermann et 
al. report that a much greater proportion of the S. typhimu-
rium population that invades the gut tissue expresses type 
III secretion system virulence factors (TTSS-1) than do the 
bacteria that remain in the gut, suggesting that TTSS-1 is 
required to invade gut tissue. Mortality of the TTSS-1-ex-
Box 1. Evolution of Altruism or Spite
For altruism or spite to evolve, Hamilton’s rule of kin selection rb > c (where 
r refers to the genetic relatedness between actor and recipient) must be 
satisfied (Hamilton, 1964, 1970). For an altruistic trait, c refers to the cost 
of the behavior to the actor, and b refers to the benefit to the recipient. In 
the context of altruism, this rule can only be satisfied if relatedness, r, is 
sufficiently positive, indicating that costly altruism can only be favored by 
selection if directed toward relatives. Whereas discrimination in choosing 
recipients is important to achieve sufficient relatedness for the evolution 
of altruism (although not essential as proximity to kin and “blind” altruism 
can suffice), discrimination is essential for the evolution of spite. Applying 
Hamilton’s rule to a spiteful trait, c again refers to the cost to the actor (c > 
0), but now b refers to the cost to the recipient (“negative benefit” where b 
< 0). Given c > 0 > b, Hamilton’s rule can only be satisfied if r is negative, 
indicating that the evolution of spite requires targeting of those individuals 
who are less related to the actor than the average member of the population 
(Hamilton, 1970).
pressing bacteria that invade the gut tissue is very high, but 
their presence induces a host inflammatory response that 
kills more competing commensal bacteria than S. typhimu-
rium. This act of self-destructive altruism by the gut tissue 
invaders therefore paves the way for invasion by their Sal-
monella brethren. (Ackermann et al., 2008).
Beard Diversity: Spite or Altruism in Action?
All of the above examples of microbial spite feature the 
concerted action of multiple genes that harm recipients 
and promote the survival of cells harboring them in the new 
environment engineered through the actions of these genes. 
Unlike a true green beard gene, these genes are at best a 
linked gene complex with opportunities for separation and 
recombination of toxin and resistance traits. This uncoupling 
of traits may provide opportunities for invasion by cheaters 
that retain the “tag” (toxin immunity) but do not carry out 
the costly social behavior (toxin production). However, a 
recent theory suggests that tag-based social behaviors can 
be readily maintained despite a reduced linkage between 
tags and behaviors if there is a diversity of tags or, to use 
the green beard analogy, many beard colors. As one tag-
behavior pairing (e.g., altruism toward green beards) comes 
to dominate, the loose linkage between traits allows exploi-
tation by cheaters (nonaltruistic green beards), who are in 
turn vulnerable to exploitation by rare new tag-behavior 
pairings (e.g., red beards and altruism toward red beards). 
Tags can thus become weak and potentially deceptive indi-
cators of relatedness (compared to a classic single-gene 
green beard) but still function more reliably than spatial 
proximity alone (Jansen and van Baalen, 2006). This sug-
gests that tag-based social systems are likely be associated 
with a diversity of tags (and associated directed altruism), 
where there is the potential for dissociation between tag and 
behavior. One example in the context of spiteful behaviors 
is that of soluble bacteriocins (pyocins) produced by the 
opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
Intriguingly, this concept of tag diversity also may be 
applicable in the case of the yeast FLO1 green beard gene. 
Unlike the csaA gene in D. discoideum, which shows little or 
no diversity within the species, FLO1 in yeast is highly vari-
able (Smukalla et al., 2008). Specifically, the number of tan-
dem repeats within FLO1 varies widely and correlates with 
the stickiness of the encoded adhesin—the more repeats, 
the greater the adhesive property. This diversity could be 
the result of broad variation in the environments encoun-
tered by the yeast, but it could also represent a discrimi-
natory specialization in the binding between specific FLO1 
variants and specific cell-surface oligosaccharides. There is 
also the possibility that single-gene green beard traits could 
be “uncoupled” and exploited by cheaters. It is conceivable 
that due to the variation in FLO1, “green-bearded” cheat-
ers—yeast expressing FLO1 with a low number of tandem 
repeats—could arise. These cheaters would maintain their 
green beard identity at a low cost to fitness, thereby exploit-
ing those yeast expressing FLO1 alleles encoding adhesins 
with a greater number of tandem repeats. Thus, true green 
beards potentially can be exploited.602 Cell 135, November 14, 2008 ©2008 Elsevier Inc.Public Signals and Discrimination
The roles of specificity, diversity, and discrimination take on a fur-
ther twist when we consider that many acts of altruism or “public 
good” are regulated in a population density-dependent manner, 
typically with the production of extracellular altruistic acts being 
switched on at higher population densities. Bacteria are able to 
estimate cell density through a process called quorum sensing, 
where a collectively produced diffusible molecule is used as a 
proxy measure of cell density. Diggle et al. (2007) showed in the 
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa that quorum-regulated pub-
lic good traits (the production of extracellular digestive enzymes) 
are vulnerable to exploitation by a range of “signal” cheaters. 
In this study, cultured wild-type quorum-sensing P. aeruginosa 
competed against a range of isogenic mutant strains defective in 
either producing or responding to the quorum-sensing molecules 
in culture. The authors report that mutant strains that “opt out” of 
quorum sensing have a fitness advantage over wild-type quorum-
sensing bacteria. In particular, the system is exploited by “signal 
blind” mutant bacteria that avoid contributing to the public good 
(the production of proteases to release nutrients from the special 
media used in the study) simply by ignoring the relevant signal to 
do so. Evolution of isogenic wild-type populations of P. aerugi-
nosa in another in vitro study also supported this notion (Sandoz 
et al., 2007). After culturing wild-type P. aeruginosa for over 100 
generations under conditions that require quorum sensing, a sub-
population of cells harboring mutations that inactivate the crucial 
quorum-sensing regulator lasR arose within the wild-type popu-
lation (Sandoz et al., 2007). These spontaneous mutants that do 
not respond to the quorum-sensing signal consistently showed 
large fitness advantages over their wild-type ancestors, again 
suggesting that the metabolic burden imposed on cells by quo-
rum sensing may make the system susceptible to the evolution 
of cheaters. The regulation of public good production by quorum 
sensing also raises the, as yet experimentally untested, possibil-
ity that cheaters purposefully overexpress a signal and therefore 
induce cooperation by gullible neighbors. Indeed, “super signal-
ers” were observed in the in vitro P. aeruginosa experiments of 
Sandoz et al. (2007). This manipulative signaling may in turn lead 
to a recalibration of the signal response, which in theory could 
result in a potential stalemate between exuberant signalers and 
cynical receivers, a microbial version of the flashy signals of avian 
mating displays (Brown and Johnstone, 2001).
Although many quorum-sensing molecules are often nonspe-
cific, with detection possible between species and even between 
kingdoms, doubt has been cast on the applicability of the term 
“signaling” in these contexts (Keller and Surette, 2006). Thus, 
only species-specific quorum-sensing molecules are consid-
ered here. The quorum-sensing molecules of P. aeruginosa are 
specific to this species, creating prime opportunities for social 
exploitation because any member of the species can potentially 
produce the signal for “public good” production in others while 
ignoring the signal themselves. One mechanism to reduce exploi-
tation by signal cheaters is to make signals more specific. Rather 
than counting all cells, a well-tailored signal would count only 
those cells with the same signaling gene cluster, thus increasing 
the chance of changing behavior to maximize spread of the gene 
cluster without helping social cheaters. Patterns of quorum sens-
ing in the bacterium Staphylococcus aureus offer intriguing hints 
that specificity is indeed an important aspect of signal design in 
microbes. S. aureus bacteria control the expression of numerous 
virulence factors (for example, secreted exotoxins) in a density-
dependent manner through the production and monitoring of 
autoinducing signal peptide (AIP) molecules. However, not all S. 
aureus AIPs are alike: Sequencing of the agr locus (controlling the 
Agr quorum-sensing system) reveals high genetic diversity across 
Staphylococcus species, with four distinct Agr types in S. aureus 
(Ji et al., 1997). Thus, Agr cells specifically measure and respond 
positively only to the densities of fellow cells of the same Agr type. 
Interestingly, this specificity itself has been exploited in a new 
way: Distinct variants interfere with each other during recognition, 
with AIP 1 blocking responses to AIP 2, and so on (Ji et al., 1997). 
Inhibition of quorum sensing in competing strains would seem 
detrimental because quorum sensing results in upregulation of 
toxins and degradative enzymes that may provide an advantage 
to all bacteria in the vicinity by producing nutrients and routes to 
new host tissues. However, inhibition of quorum sensing results 
in overexpression of bacterial attachment factors, keeping cells 
stuck to surfaces and preventing them from colonizing newly 
available host tissues. Clearly, optimal strategies for exploiting 
and interfering with quorum sensing will depend on the specific 
ecology of the bacteria.
Microbes have incredibly complex and sophisticated social 
lives that we are only beginning to understand. As a result, 
microbes present a unique opportunity to test social evolution 
theory and to garner clear support for the notion that individu-
ally costly cooperation is favored when individuals with the same 
genes can interact (through the process of kin selection). But is 
discrimination of social partners by microbes of more than just 
academic interest? We think it is for two reasons. First, manipu-
lating the social life of pathogenic microbes could be a strategy 
for combating infection by antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Social 
cheaters engineered to be nonpathogenic could be introduced to 
infected hosts to weaken the population of pathogenic bacteria. 
Introducing spiteful producers of microbe-specific toxins would 
have a similar effect. Knowledge of the specificity of social inter-
actions among microbes of course will be crucial. Second, given 
the low levels of recombination in many microbes, other genes 
are likely to be linked with social recognition genes. Thus, selec-
tion of particular social recognition genes could lead to correlated 
selection for other ecologically relevant traits, such as virulence 
and antibiotic resistance.AcknowLeDgMentS
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